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To date, the scholarly discussion of intellectual humility has paid little attention to the 
role played by sacred scriptures in the formation and development of that quality in 
communities of faith. Even where contributions have been theological in character, the 
normative role of scripture—however this may be conceived—has been discussed only 
marginally, with the focus instead being on the contributions of later theologians, such 
as Augustine or Aquinas. My own forthcoming study, The New Testament and 
Intellectual Humility (Macaskill, 2019),1 is unusual in this regard, being dedicated 
specifically to the function of the New Testament (operating within the broader canon 
of Scripture) in the formation of intellectual humility within Christian communities and 
the individuals who comprise them. My intention in this article is to reflect on some of 
the ways in which the findings of that study differ from the general discussion or debate 
around intellectual humility. These differences are probably somewhat baffling to many 
involved in the scholarly discussion, to the extent that they appear to involve issues 
entirely different to the ones normally discussed, but they are quite intelligible in the 
context of a functionally theological study of the Bible. The challenge of relating these 
findings to the wider discussion highlights the extent to which that discussion has 
abstracted the concept of intellectual humility from the realities with which it is 
enmeshed and by which it is defined in communities of faith.  
 
1. Textuality and Identity, Lexicon and Grammar: The Way the Words Run  
 
Even if the concept of ‘authority’ or ‘normativity’ is attached to the Bible in different 
ways by different traditions, most Christian communities would consider it to be a body 
of writing that distinctively shapes, resources and controls Christian thought and 
                                                 
1 This monograph will be the output of my funded involvement with the John 
Templeton Foundation-St Louis University project, The Philosophy and Theology of 
Intellectual Humility. I am grateful to the funders for their generous support.  
  
practice in a way that is not true of any other writings. It will be read, discussed, quoted 
and considered in ways that functionally set it apart from other sources of theology or 
ethics. The label ‘Scripture’, often capitalized, marks its distinctive functional 
significance in the lives of Christians and their communities. 
 The normative function of Scripture for Christian theology, however, must be 
understood in terms defined by its formal character. Scripture ‘norms’ Christian thought 
and practice, not as a treatise or propositional document, but as an apparently untidy 
collection of narratives, proverbs, parables, poems, hymns, prophecies, contracts and 
(in a smaller proportion than often recognized) laws. Indeed, the generic boundaries 
between these categories are rather permeable, with legal content embedded in 
narratives, narratives expressed in songs, parables and proverbs delivered in gospels, 
and so on. Theological tradition has always recognized the need to give orderly 
accounts of what we find in Scripture, but these accounts do not displace or replace the 
unruly collection of Scripture itself. One of the pitfalls facing theologians, and readers 
or hearers in general, is the risk of allowing one of the generic forms found within the 
biblical collection to become dominant over our systematic account: for some, the 
commandments (or, more abstractly, the concepts of ‘command’ or ‘law’) dominate; 
for others, narrative plays such a role, particularly a grand narrative that moves from 
genesis to palingenesis.2 A proper account of scriptural normativity, however, is 
attentive to its generic complexity and will allow this to define its operation. We 
encounter ‘the word of God’ as much in a proverb or poem as we do in the Decalogue. 
 As a generically complex collection, Scripture shapes the thought of its readers and 
hearers3 by means of language acts. Particular words are used, with particular 
grammatical constructions. Biblical scholars are attentive to the original languages 
because subtle features of lexical choice and grammar can be lost in translation, or can 
be highlighted by the translational processes associated with the biblical manuscripts 
                                                 
2 On this point, see Kevin Vanhoozer, First Theology (Downers Grove: Intervarsity 
Press, 2002), 151–4. 
3 It is easy to forget that widespread literacy is a fairly recent phenomenon. Most 
popular encounter with Scripture through the centuries has taken place through hearing.  
  
themselves, such as in the translation of Hebrew or Aramaic into Greek.4 Importantly, 
these language acts can sometimes be surprising or even jarring and this is precisely 
how they work to shape our cognition: we hear something we do not expect, and our 
mind changes in response. 
 For the discussion of intellectual humility, this proves to be quite significant. 
Particular word groups are used to denote humility in general and, at specific points, 
these are connected to the representation of good and bad thinking. In Hebrew, the 
principle word group centres on the verb ‘anah (הנע) and the cognate substantive 
‘anaw, with its plural ‘anawim (ונע, םיונע). The word group etymologically designates 
poverty, with ‘anawim often occurring not just in the Bible but also in Second Temple 
Jewish literature to designate ‘the poor’. Two further verbs are also encountered at 
points, shachach (חחש), meaning ‘to bow down’ and shaphal (לפש), meaning ‘to be 
low’. The Hebrew vocabulary, then, is very particularly associated with issues of status 
or position: to be humble is to be ‘poor’ or ‘low’. To recognize this is not to make the 
error of confusing distant etymology with contemporary usage: there are points in the 
text of the Old Testament where each of the words is used with its original significance, 
something reflected in Greek translations, which use multiple different words to render 
the significance of the ‘ana- group, sometimes favouring the vocabulary of humility 
(tapeinos, tapeinoō, praus, et cetera), but sometimes the terminology of poverty 
(penēs). This is a similar situation to the one English speakers face when they use the 
‘poor’: it may label a condition of financial deprivation, or it may label something that 
elicits sympathy. The critical point for the biblical material is that the association of 
these words with low status is retained.  
 Importantly, this positional element is represented in positive terms when it is 
defined relationally with respect to God. This positivity is, in fact, the first surprising 
twist we encounter in how the language of humility is deployed in the Bible. It is widely 
recognized that the positive view of humility found in the Jewish and Christian 
                                                 
4 Biblical scholars recognise the distinctive place of translations of the Hebrew and 
Aramaic texts of the Old Testament into Greek, often designated (questionably) the 
Septuagint or LXX. Quotations of the Old Testament in the New reflect the use of such 
translations, possibly alongside Hebrew or Aramaic texts. The terms Old and New 
Testament are, of course, distinctively Christian labels for these scriptures. 
  
traditions was an oddity in the ancient world and the explanation is connected to the 
details of monotheism, as reflected in the Shema: 
 
The LORD our God, the LORD is one. Love the LORD your God with all your 
heart and with all your soul and with all your strength. (Deut 6:4–5, NIV) 
 
It is not intrinsically a good thing to be poor, but to be in a position of acknowledged 
poverty in relation to God is good, for it involves a recognition of dependency upon 
him; similarly, the acknowledgement that we are ‘low’ before God recognizes the need 
to submit to his rule. The narrative around the Shema, the whole story of the Exodus 
and subsequent wilderness sojourn, brings out both dimensions, as the Israelites rely 
upon divine care and provision and learn to submit to his rule, even if imperfectly. Both 
of these dimensions entail a recognition that we are not autonomous, and that our 
relationship to the world of things around us is not an autonomous one: we are 
dependent upon God as creator and providential caregiver, and we are subject to his 
reign. When this is related to the various passages that speak of God’s role in the life 
of the cosmos (e.g., Job 38–41, with its descriptions of God’s creative work and the 
intimacy of his involvement in providing and caring for the world and its constituents) 
we begin to see humility as a term that labels what it means to live rightly in God’s 
world, interacting with the things around us as realities invested with God’s care, rather 
than simply as commodities that we can possess and deploy as if they (and we, as acting 
subjects) are isolable objects.  
 The verbs are used in ways that highlight that humility is not an instinctive quality, 
or even one that is formed naturally, but rather a condition occupied by a decision or 
intervention that disrupts the native condition of non-humility. Commonly, the verb is 
found in reflexive form: people are expected to ‘humble themselves’ or are castigated 
for their failure to do so, while others are humbled by God. Those who fail to humble 
themselves are sometimes described as ‘stiff-necked’, an agricultural label that 
indicates their refusal to yield to the steering hand of the LORD. In fact, the existence 
of verbs of humility is itself an interesting defining feature of the concept: humility is 
the condition that obtains in those who have humbled themselves or been humbled, 
while pride is the condition that obtains in those who have not practiced this verb.   
 This also means that a cluster of qualities are often related to the practicing of 
humility. Those who are openly dependent upon God are characterised by gratitude and 
  
by hope, often manifest as a learned willingness to be patient for his provision. Those 
who yield to his rule limit their conduct according to his commandments; they wait 
upon God faithfully.  
 If this language defines humility as a general concept, it is also what defines its 
specifically intellectual instantiations. There is no point in the Scriptural material where 
something is called ‘intellectual humility’ that corresponds to the modern concept. The 
closest we come to this is the word tapeinophrosunē in Philippians 2:3, which broadly 
means ‘humility of mind/wisdom’. I will return to this in the next section, for the word 
is used in association with the incarnational reality, but at this point the key to note is 
that it designates a particular cognitive manifestation of the general concept of humility, 
something highlighted by the following statement: 
 
Let the same mind be in you that was in Christ Jesus,  
 who, though he was in the form of God, 
  did not regard equality with God 
  as something to be exploited (Phil 2:5, NRSV). 
 
Instead, what we find in Scripture is a host of ways in which the one who is humble 
thinks in ways that are shaped by dependency and submission upon God, while the one 
who is proud thinks in ways that are not. This, in turn, impacts on the way that things 
are known and the kinds of perceptions that are attached to them. This “knowing” is 
not simply about comprehending an object properly, but about properly relating to it, 
interacting with it in a way that is fitting. Things cannot be known properly in isolation, 
but must be known in terms of the divine economy. Hence, the great statement of 
enlightenment in the Wisdom tradition: ‘The fear of the LORD is the beginning of 
wisdom.’  
While the language of humility is nowhere found in the description of the Fall in 
Genesis 3, the account can be read in such terms, in light of their broader biblical usage, 
with obvious cognitive overtones. The serpent seeks to disrupt the submission of Adam 
and Eve to the divine command, and does so by challenging the nature of their 
dependency upon God’s provision. If they will eat this forbidden fruit, then they will 
become like gods themselves, ‘knowing good from evil’. The parallels with the 
Prometheus myth are obvious and often mentioned, but contextually what is significant 
is that it is the characteristics that will later be associated with the vocabulary of 
  
humility that the serpent targets. Its strategy, moreover, is one that centres on the 
undermining of gratitude for the provision of all the other fruits. The paradigmatic sin, 
then, is one that involves a failure to sustain humility. Humility is part of what is lost at 
the Fall, and with it understanding. If ‘the fear of the LORD is the beginning of wisdom’ 
then this sin is the beginning of folly. Here, the truth of God is exchanged for a lie: 
‘they became futile in their thinking, and their senseless minds were darkened’ (Rom 
1:21). There is a word for this in Scripture: idolatry. The writers of the biblical texts, 
particularly those of the New Testament, see this idolatry precisely as a force that 
distorts knowledge and that is exposed by divine activity (1 Cor 1:18–21). Pride is a 
correlate of this, because it involves a perception that one is self-sufficient, whether in 
terms of acquiring goods to sustain and enrich oneself, or in terms of differentiating 
good and evil. The proud person sees no need to be grateful for their daily bread, or to 
yield their sense of right and wrong to the commandments of God.  
There are undoubtedly some parallels between this basic lexicon and grammar of 
humility and the concepts of intellectual humility that mark the scholarly study. Most 
obviously, the lexicon points to humility as something defined in terms of position or 
status, which sounds rather like the ‘low concern for status’ approach (cf. Roberts and 
Wood, 2007). In the acknowledgement of dependency upon God, it also suggests 
something of an ownership of limits (cf. Whitcomb, et al., 2015). In the confidence it 
can have in its knowledge, when this is contextualised by proper relationship with 
God—its confidence to state that the fear of the LORD is the beginning of wisdom—it 
echoes the doxastic (Church and Samuelson, 2017). But in each of these cases, it is very 
distinctively shaped with reference to God and the covenant that defines his relationship 
with the redeemed. It is particularised by these things, and an element of the 
particularity is that humility is as strongly associated with the volitional dimension of 
cognition as the epistemic. To think humbly is not just a condition for the right 
knowledge of things, but a condition for the right decisions of how to live. To be 
intellectually humble is not just a matter of epistemic rightness, but of volitional 
righteousness. 
This last statement anticipates something that will run through the rest of the article. 
If the biblical material leads its readers to the conclusion that ‘there is no-one righteous, 
not even one’ (Rom 3:10, quoting Pss 14:1 and 15:1), then how might any of us be 
expected to attain a state of intellectual humility, such that we will both know and decide 
righteously? For the New Testament writers, the answer (however variously expressed) 
  
lies in the incarnation of Jesus Christ and the accompanying work of the Spirit to renew 
minds after his likeness.   
 
2. The Way the Words Run around the Word Made Flesh.        
 
We have already seen a surprising twist in the way that the lexicon of humility is used 
in the Bible, when compared to other examples of ancient thought: humility is 
represented in positive terms. The twist is intensified and progressed in the New 
Testament, and subsequently in Christian theology, by the association of the concept 
with the object of worship himself. At key points, Jesus Christ is represented as humble 
and those points happen also to involve some of the clearest and most forceful 
articulations of his identification as God. We have already mentioned one of these 
passages, Philippians 2:1–11. Here, Paul’s addressees are enjoined to ‘think’ 
(phroneite) within themselves in the same way that Christ did (2:5), with this 
corresponding to the ‘humility of mind’ (tapienophrosunē) that is called for in verse 3. 
Importantly, the humility of mind is manifest in a commitment to pursuing the good of 
others, and not simply of oneself; that is, it is identified with acts of love, by which the 
good of others is given a higher priority than one’s own interests or prerogatives, 
sometimes demanding that those prerogatives are set aside. This is exemplified by the 
incarnational story itself, within which the one who is ‘in the form of God’ divests 
himself of the privileges5 associated with his divine status and takes the form of a 
servant or slave (doulos), in order to bring about salvation. Importantly, the ‘humility 
of mind’ is not something that is brought about by the taking of a lowly form, an 
acknowledgement of the limitations that characterize this state, but is the thing that 
leads to and makes possible this taking. Because the one in the form of God is humble, 
                                                 
5 The question of what, precisely, is indicated by the use of the verb kenoō has been 
widely explored. The cognate noun, kenosis, is not used in the text, but has been 
associated with ‘kenotic christologies’ which consider the Son to have given up some 
of the attributes of divinity in the incarnation. For our purposes, we can largely ignore 
these christologies (which are, in fact, shaped more by the accounts of the gospels than 
by Philippians 2), since what matters here is that the humility in question causes the 
incarnation, rather than resulting from it.  
  
he takes the form of a servant. The humility here is a quality of one who is identified 
with the plenitude and perfection of God himself. 
 In certain regards, this is consistent with the ‘low concern for status’ definition, but 
its significance is richer because of the sheer qualitative distance between the status of 
deity and doulos (“servant” or “slave”). The passage, moreover, makes clear that the 
one who has undertaken this act of self-divestment will subsequently be the object of 
praise and honor (2:9–11), so that there is not so much a low concern for status—there 
is actually a very high concern for this, linked to the expectation of proper worship—
but rather a commitment to serving the needs of others. For this reason (and out of a 
recognition of the driving significance of Isaiah’s Fourth Servant song for the 
representation of Jesus in Philippians 2), my own approach to the passage has centred 
on the concept of ‘servanthood’. The one who is humble serves; tapeinophrosunē labels 
how such a one thinks. 
 In Matthew 11:25–31, we encounter another dramatic example of the association 
of humility with the one who is incarnate. Using language often seen as reminiscent of 
that used of (or by) Wisdom herself in the biblical and postbiblical material, Jesus says  
 
28 “Come to me, all you that are weary and are carrying heavy burdens, and I will 
give you rest.  29 Take my yoke upon you, and learn from me; for I am gentle and 
humble in heart, and you will find rest for your souls.      
 
In fact, we have two of the words used as Greek translations for the Hebrew anaw- : 
tapeinos and praus, the latter translated here as ‘gentle’. Contextually, the words are 
interesting for several reasons. The first is that Jesus’ interactions with his interlocutors 
hardly evince an open-mindedness of the kind often associated with intellectual 
humility. Quite the opposite, Jesus begins to ‘reproach’ or ‘denounce’ (oneidizein) 
those who have failed to understand the significance of his ministry and have not 
repented. He goes on to associate this with the hiddenness of these truths (‘these things’, 
11:25) to ‘the wise and intelligent’, and their disclosure to ‘infants’ (nēpioi). This leads 
to the second reason that the language of humility here is interesting, which is that it is 
used in connection with some very lofty claims to knowledge: 
 
  
All things have been handed over to me by my Father; and no one knows the Son 
except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to whom 
the Son chooses to reveal him (Matt 11:27, NRSV). 
 
There is here no ownership of limits or acknowledgement of bias. We might, in fact, 
consider this a very dramatic articulation of Jesus’ humility, understood in doxastic 
terms; without culpability, he can claim to know the Father in a unique way, and to 
have custody of ‘all things’. But the loftiness of his claim to knowledge is given its 
point by the coordination of these two words for humility—tapeinos and praus—that 
indicate he will make himself present and accessible to those who are impoverished. 
Those who are weary and heavy laden are exhorted to ‘come’ to him. That this 
exhortation immediately follows his statement concerning the Son’s freedom to reveal 
the Father to whomever he chooses is important: to ‘come’ to the Son and find rest is 
to be the recipient of this disclosure. And the disclosure, crucially, is one constituted by 
personal presence. As Pardue notes, this is an element traceable back into the 
representation of God in the Old Testament: even in his lofty exaltation, God is a friend 
to the poor, the widow and the orphan, and makes himself present with them. Presence 
is, moreover, a prominent theme in Matthew’s Gospel: Jesus is announced with the 
name Emmanuel, God with Us, in 1:23 and following his resurrection promises to be 
‘with’ his disciples to the end of the age (28:20). Here, though, this emphasis on 
presence is distinctively associated with the disclosure of knowledge: those in the 
presence of the humble and gentle one know the Son, and by knowing the Son they 
know the Father. 
 Readers or hearers of the New Testament, then, find their understanding of 
‘humility’, and its manifestation in their intellectual lives, to be developed in surprising 
ways by the incarnational narratives. First, the language of humility can be attached to 
God himself, as something that labels his willingness to serve those who have no 
capacity to return his gift6 and, as such, something associated with plenitude and 
                                                 
6 The point has been made recently by Barclay, 2015 that Paul’s representation of the 
divine gift needs to be set against the background of ancient gift-giving, which was a 
kind of economic practice that expected some kind of return from the one to whom a 
gift was given. The radical quality of God’s gift is that, unlike other such gifts, it is 
made to those who are incapable of return.   
  
freedom, not deficiency or limitation. This aspect of humility’s semantic range is linked 
to the “positional” quality of the language: God does not remain aloof from the 
impoverished but lowers himself to be with them, and his doing so is an act of strength, 
not weakness. Second, and flowing from this, the language is connected with the 
volitional dimension of cognition: the one who is humble chooses to act in a way that 
disregards matters of status or honor. Third, there is an epistemic dimension, but it is 
connected to a particular kind of knowledge that can be known only by personal 
presence and interpersonal disclosure: we can know God, only because he makes 
himself accessible to us through the Son. This makes the knowledge of God something 
in which there is no grounds for boasting: we have not ‘achieved’ such knowledge,7 but 
have been given it. 
 
3. The Spirit and the Renewal of the Mind: Can We Really Speak of ‘Virtue’? 
 
Humility, then, is given a particular and complex8 significance by the biblical material, 
one that is represented as having implications for how we think. The lexicon of 
humility, the grammar with which it is used, and the deployment of these in relation to 
the incarnational narrative leaves us with a sense of what it means ‘to think humbly’ 
that is somewhat different from much of the discussion of intellectual humility. This is 
not a criticism of the scholarship, but simply an acknowledgement that intellectual 
humility is always particularised within religious communities by their sacred 
                                                 
7 Cf. Greco, 2010. 
8 By this, I mean that the vocabulary of humility is not reducible to a single discrete 
concept but involves a set of inter-related values and dispositions associated with both 
creatures and their Creator. For creatures, particularly for sentient ones, humility 
involves dependency upon God and submission to his rule. It also involves an 
acknowledgement of the power of sin and idolatry to disrupt or distort this basic 
relationship. For God, humility involves a willingness to stoop or to condescend, in 
order to bring blessing to the lowly. Both of these meanings emerge from the basic 
lexical association of humility with lowness or poverty. When God assumes a creaturely 
nature in the incarnation, or when creatures participate in the divine life through the 
incarnation, the divine and human elements of humility can co-exist.     
  
scriptures, as works of language. This needs to be part of the consideration of 
intellectual humility, particularly as a practical theological topic. 
 One further issue must now be considered. We noted that humility is not an intuitive 
or native thing for humans, nor one principally represented as being acquired through 
gradual formation: instead it is linked to deliberate acts of humbling ourselves or being 
humbled by God, so that we occupy a proper relationship with him, one of dependency 
and submission. Within the New Testament, such ideas of reflexive transformation 
(doing something to ourselves) or divine disruption (where God does something within 
us) become particularised around believers’ union with Christ, realised by the operation 
of the Holy Spirit. This is, perhaps, most dramatically seen in Paul’s writings, and 
Romans 8:5–11 is as good a passage as any to illustrate the point, especially as it bears 
on the mind: 
 
5 For those who live according to the flesh set their minds on the things of the flesh, 
but those who live according to the Spirit set their minds on the things of the Spirit.  
6 To set the mind on the flesh is death, but to set the mind on the Spirit is life and 
peace.  
 
9   But you are not in the flesh; you are in the Spirit, since the Spirit of God dwells 
in you. Anyone who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him.  10 
But if Christ is in you, though the body is dead because of sin, the Spirit is life 
because of righteousness.  11 If the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead 
dwells in you, he who raised Christ from the dead will give life to your mortal 
bodies also through his Spirit that dwells in you.     
 
What emerges from the wider body of Paul’s writing, with parallels elsewhere in the 
New Testament,9 is that this ‘Christopneumatic’10 core to Christian cognitive agency 
drills down into our very sense of self-hood and identity, and does so in a highly 
disruptive way. Again, Paul gives the starkest articulation of this sense of disruption: 
                                                 
9 Most notably, the representation of new birth in John 3:7 or 1 Pet 1:3.  
10 This term is sometimes used in connection with historical theologies (particularly of 
the sacraments) that have recognised the combination of Christological and 
pneumatological elements. See, e.g., Chauvet, 1995, 252. 
  
 
I have been crucified with Christ and it is no longer I who lives, but Christ lives in 
me (Gal 2:19–20, NRSV).   
 
This basic disruption to Paul’s sense of who he is as a moral or cognitive agent results 
in a radical openness to new ways of thinking:   
 
From now on, therefore, we regard no one from a human point of view (literally, 
‘according to flesh’ kata sarka); even though we once knew Christ from a human 
point of view, we know him no longer in that way. (2 Cor 5:16, NRSV) 
 
Yet whatever gains I had, these I have come to regard (hēgēmai) as loss because of 
Christ (Phil 3:7) 
 
Paul has come to occupy a different set of opinions and beliefs, because of the 
disruption of his stable sense of identity, through what he perceives to be the work of 
the Spirit. His mind has been opened to new evaluations, and his old way of thinking—
including his religious beliefs—he now sees as corrupted by the instincts of his flesh.  
 For Paul, of course, this disruption can be traced back to his encounter with the 
risen Jesus on the road to Damascus; there, he was confronted by God and humbled. 
He extends this disruptive language to all believers, however:  
 
So if anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation: everything old has passed away; 
see, everything has become new (2 Cor 5:17, NRSV).  
 
Furthermore, the imagery of new identity in Christ is often used reflexively, using the 
language of clothing: 
 
As many of you as were baptized into Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ 
(Gal 3:27, NRSV) 
 
Put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh, to gratify its 
desires (Rom 13:14, NRSV) 
 
  
As an equivalent to the language of humbling oneself, then, we find the language of 
clothing oneself with another. The noetic significance of this emerges in Ephesians 4 
and Colossians 3   
 
22You were taught to put away your former way of life, your old self, corrupt and 
deluded by its lusts, 23 and to be renewed in the spirit of your minds, 24 and to clothe 
yourselves with the new self, created according to the likeness of God in true 
righteousness and holiness. (Eph 4:22–24, NRSV) 
 
9 Do not lie to one another, seeing that you have stripped off the old self with its 
practices 10 and have clothed yourselves with the new self, which is being renewed 
in knowledge according to the image of its creator. (Col 3:9–10, NRSV)
 
 
The intellectual transformation of believers, then, is not simply associated with some 
personal moral progress or formation, but with a perceived re-mapping of their identity 
onto that of another person, with whom they have clothed themselves. 
 I stress this because it lay at the heart of the critique of much virtue theory by the 
early Reformers, and remains a necessary part of any account of moral identity that 
seeks to take the New Testament witness seriously. This means that any talk of ‘virtue’ 
is immediately qualified, and continues to be used only in a qualified way: the 
development of intellectual humility (as represented in the New Testament) is not the 
result of the progress and development of the individual person through processes of 
personal formation, but is a result of that person being demolished and remade in union 
with someone else. To put this slightly differently, the intellectual humility that might 
come to mark a believer is not something that grows out of the nurturing of who they 
are, but out of the presence in them of someone else. It is because the one who says ‘I 
am humble and gentle in spirit’ resides in them that they can be humble themselves.11 
                                                 
11 This should not remove the notions of formation and discipline from accounts of 
Christian life, but it does require them to be conceived carefully with respect to the 
person of Jesus Christ. I examine this in greater depth in my forthcoming book, Paul’s 
Ethics of Participation: Union with Christ and the Christian Moral Life (Grand Rapids: 
  
 The point underpins a further observation, which is that the reflexive act of clothing 
ourselves with Christ is not represented as a comfortably complete work, but as an on-
going and difficult obligation of Christian life, taking place in constant tension with the 
persistence of sin in the lives of believers and their communities. This is important, for 
it serves to explain and acknowledge something that may occur to readers: Christians 
are not necessary intellectually humble. While this statement may reflect cultural 
assumptions about what humility involves that ought to be called into question—Jesus, 
we have already noted, was humble in a rather abrasive way!—it also rightly recognises 
the continuing presence of arrogance within the communities of the church. This should 
be called out and exposed, but our account gives us a category within which to place 
such arrogance properly: it is a sign of sin’s persistence, a witness to the incompleteness 
of sanctification in the lives of believers, which can only be addressed by the disruptive 
presence of the Spirit of Christ.   
 
Conclusions  
My intention for this article has not been to resolve any of the debates around 
intellectual humility, or to suggest that there is anything superior about how the concept 
might be informed by the New Testament. Rather, my point has been to call attention 
to some of the ways in which the concept is particularised within faith communities that 
cherish the biblical material as sacred scripture, for whom it is normative. There is, of 
course, a significant overlap between the scriptures of Judaism and Christianity, but 
also a difference in the eventual shape that the canon will take for each. Both traditions 
operate with concepts of humility that bear on one’s cognitive life, which are shaped 
by these texts, whether read or heard through the reading of others. As such, intellectual 
humility is distinctively defined by the words used and the way these words run, that 
is, by the lexicon and the grammar of humility. For the Christian tradition, the 
application of the lexical and grammatical elements to the story of Jesus becomes 
pivotal to how intellectual humility is conceived. 
 Obviously, I have only been able to isolate some of the major elements that are 
important in the development of the concept in the New Testament; I consider much 
more of the detail in my forthcoming monograph on the topic. I have also done little 
                                                 
Baker, 2019), which involves extensive reflection on how Christian moral identity can 
be nourished.      
  
here to consider how the process of reading or hearing this material might change the 
cognitive state or disposition of the reader; in due course, we might hope, those 
involved in the emergent application of cognitive science to the Bible might offer 
studies of this kind.  
Rather than simply restate the findings of each section, I conclude by noting the 
following points, as features of the representation found in Christian scripture. First, 
intellectual humility is not reducible to a single, simple definition, but is a complex or 
multipartite concept associated with the cognition of someone who is humble. This 
complex notion of humility has different constituent elements that might appear 
separately or together in the lives of humble persons. This recognizes that while one 
strand of humility involves a recognition of our sinfulness and capacity to know things 
badly or idolatrously, another strand involves the acknowledgement of dependency 
upon God, and another strand—which may be associated with God himself—involves 
a simple willingness to set aside one’s own prerogatives in order to pursue the good of 
others. The strands may appear together, but will not always do so. Second, the lexicon 
of humility foregrounds the positional associations of the word groups, which designate 
poverty or lowness, but it does so in a distinctively relational way. It is good to be 
humble, not because it is good to be poor in itself, but because it is good to acknowledge 
one’s dependency upon God’s providence; it is good to be humble, not because there is 
anything intrinsically good about the posture of bowing, but because it is good to yield 
to the rule of God in one’s life. Third, insofar as Christians cherish intellectual humility, 
it is not as something that they can foster from within themselves, but something they 
derive from the presence of another within them. I no longer live, but Christ lives in 
me; because of that, I know things differently.        
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